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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

POINT I
RULE 64D, PROVIDING FOR THE GARNISHMENT OF CHOSES IN ACTION, IS
SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO ALLO'V GARNISHMENT OF A CONTRACT CLAIM: UN1

DER A POLICY OF INSURANCE WHETHER
THAT POLICY BE FIRE INSURANCE, LIABILITY INSURANCE OR ROBBERY INSURANCE.
It is important to remember in this case that gar-

nishment is strictly a statutory proceeding under the
laws of each state. This brings into interpretation
U.C.A. 1953, Rule 64D, which, it is respectfully submitted, is one of the most liberal garnishment statutes
to be found in the United States. In this respect, Utah
has been a leader in the trend toward liberalization of
garnishment statutes.
Since Utah's garnishment statute is more liberal
than any statute interpreted in the cases cited by the
plaintiffs, it follows that this Court should be prepared
to accept the rationale of those cases cited by the plaintiffs.
The defendant attempted to distinguish Ackerman
v. Tobin, 22 F. 2d 541 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied,
276 U.S. 628, 72 L. Ed. 739, 48 S. Ct. 321 (1928),
where the court held that an unliquidated contract claim
under a property (robbery) insurance policy was subject to garnishment, by referring to fire insurance cases
and then attempting to distinguish the latter from liability insurance. The defendant's citation of 6 Am. J ur.
2d 679 and the analogy between fire and robbery insurance are very appropriate; however, the distinction
drawn by the defendant at page 29 of his brief (which
followed some illogical reasoning taken from the iso-
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lated Tennessee case of Gray v. Houck, 167 Tenn.
233, 68 S. ,V. 2d l l 7 ( 1934) is clearly untenable.
In Finch v. Great Anierican Ins. Co., 101 Conn.
332, 125 A. 628, 629, 38 A.L.R. 1068 (1924), the
question arose as to whether, under the standard form
of fire insurance policy, "a debt is due" from the underwriter to the insured within the meaning of the Connecticut foreign attachment statute after a loss by fire
but before proof of loss. The loss was not payable until
60 days after notice, ascertainment, estimate and satisfactory proof of loss. Furthermore, the policy provided
that no suit or action could be maintained against the
insurer until the insured had complied with all policy
prov1s1ons.
In allowing garnishment by the plaintiff the Supreme Court of Errors said:
"A policy of fire insurance is an agreement to
indemnify the insured against loss by fire to the
property insured. Before any loss, and while the:
policy remains in force, the liability of the underwriter is contingent. 'Vhen, as here, the policy
is in force at the time of a loss by fire which is
covered by the policy, the contingent liability
of the underwriter is thereby converted into a
present contract obligation to pay whatever sum,
not exceeding the amount of the policy, will in
fact indemnify the insured; payment being necessarily deferred until the amount of the loss is
ascertained.
"In the standard form of fire insurance policy,
the required process of liquidating the loss is
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minutely specified, with reference to protecting
the company against excessive or fraudulent
claims; and the tiling of proofs of loss by the
insured is one step in that process. A failure to
do so within the time limited may bar the enforcement of the underwriter's obligation, because it is so agreed in the policy; but the obligation itself is manifestly (Teated by the promise
to pay in case of a loss by fire, and by the happening of that contingency. The steps which
the insured is required by the policy to take,
before he can collect or sue for the loss, relate
to matters, the performance of which is exclusively within the Yolition of the insured. In
effect, he is required to furnish a bill of particulars in support of his claim. This is not with a
view to creating a debt; on the contrary, the
filing of proof of loss necessarily involves the
assertion by the insured of the existence of an
antecedent debt. So the provisions of the policy
requiring the filing of proofs of loss tacitly assume the existence of an obligation to indemnify.
The whole procedure after the loss is for the
purpose of finding out whether the claimed obligation to indemnify has arisen, and, if so, to
ascertain its amount."
Garnishment has similarly been allowed in other
jurisdictions. In Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Citizens' Bank,
166 Ark. 551, 266 S.W. 675, 39 A.L.R. 1458, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed garnishment of a
claim under a fire insurance policy even though the
proceeds were not yet payable. Also, in Brainard v.
Rogers, 74 Cal. App. 247, 239 P. 1095 (Dist. Ct. App.
1925), under an insurance policy providing that no
action could be maintained by the insured against the
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insurer until after proof of loss had been filed, and
interpreting the narrow California statute, the issue
was resolved against the garnishee.
"The sole question which is in issue on tLc
appeal is: Are the proceeds of a fire insurance
policy subject to garnishment at the instance of
the creditor of the insured subsequent to a fire
loss, but prior to an adjustment of that loss between the insurer and the insured? Our answer
to this question is in the affirmative for the reasons which will follow."
The defendant would distinguish these cases by
asserting that an obligation exists under a fire insurance policy when the fire occurs, but that no obligation
exists under a liability insurance policy until the liability
of the insured has been established by judgment or
agreement. This position is patently untenable for the
reasons which will follow.
The rationale of the Finch case, supra, dealing with
fire insurance is clearly applicable to the case at bar.
The literal language of that case is appropriate when
applied to the facts at hand. In both instances all events
which would create liability occur at the time of the
loss. The whole procedure after the loss is for the purpose of finding out whether the claimed liability of the
insurer has arisen, and, if so, to ascertain its amount.
The plaintiffs merely desire to follow this procedure,
and for so doing they should not be precluded by the
argument that no obligation exists under a liability
msurance policy until the liability of the insured has
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been established. The defendant obviously begs the
question in his attempt to create a narrow and unrealistic distinction wholly inconsistent with modern legal
trends involving motor vehicles and a mobile population.
The issue m this case is identical to that in the
property insurance cases previously cited: Does an
insurance contract provide a res which is capable of
supporting a garnishment lien after all facts which
would create liability have occurred? The question
must be answered in the affirmative regardless of the
nature of the insurance contract. The required process
of liquidating the loss is minutely specified in the standard form of insurance policy in order to protect the
insurance company against excessive, fraudulent or
spurious claims. The reason for this process will not
be defeated by allowing the plaintiffs to establish a
lien by garnishment. All defenses which the insurance
company had would still be available subsequent to
garnishment. This applies to both property and liability
insurance. In the property insurance cases the courts
have indicated that subsequent to garnishment the
underwriter's obligation may be barred by some defense
such as fraud, arson, failure to give notice, failure to
make proof of loss, failure to make an adjustment or
liquidate, or exercise of the insurer's option to replace
the property. Likewise, in the liability, insurance cases,
the plaitniff's claim is subject to the defenses of con·
tributary negligence, fraud, etc. In fact, the Utah
6

Safety Responsibility Act has eliminated some of the
defenses in liability insurance cases.
It is respectfully submitted that under Utah's
broad garnishment statute no reason can be found for
distinguishing between property and liability insurance
as to the availability of a res subject to garnishment.
Consequently, the subject insurance contract is subject
to garnishment in this case.

POINT II
THE GARNISHEE'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORIES SH 0 'VE D
THAT THE GARNISHEE HAD PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN ITS POSSESSION OR UNDER
ITS CONTROL BELONGING TO THE DEFENDANT; THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFFS 'VERE NOT REQUIRED TO REPLY
TO THE GARNISHEE'S ANS-\VER.
The defendants assert that the plaintiffs are precluded from questioning the correctness of the garnishee's answer to interrogatories by failure to reply
to such answer. In support of this contention the defendants quote from U.C.A. 1953, Rule 64 D (i). However, the defendants' quotation ends short of the applicable sentence.
" ... If such answer shmn; that the garnishC:"e
has personal property of any kind in his possession or under his control belonging to th~
defendant, the Court shall enter judgment ~hat
7

the garnishee <leli,'er the same to the sheriff,
and if the plaintiff recovers Judgment against
the defendant in the action, such property or
so much thereof as may be necessary shall be
sold upon execution, and the proceeds applied
toward the satisfaction of such judgment, together with the costs of the action and proceedings." (Emphasis added) .
This sentence becomes the relevant portion of the
subparagraph when considered in the light of the
answer to interrogatory No. 4. To that interrogatory
the garnishee answered in the affirmative that there
was in effect at the time of the accident a policy of
liability insurance covering the vehicle driven by the
defendant Cox. By answering this specific interrogatory
in the affirmative the garnishee has, as a matter of law,
admitted that a chose in action exists. The garnishee's
contrary answer to the general interrogatory (No. 2)
was merely an erroneous interpretation of law which
would obviously be contested by plaintiffs if The
Travelers Insurance Company had sought any judgment. The plaintiffs are not to be bound by such an
erroneous interpretation of law.
Furthermore, the sentence quoted by defendants
from subparagraph ( i) of Rule 64 D indicates that
judgment may be entered upon the answer in favor of
the garnishee and defendant. However, neither the
garnishee, The Travelers Insurance Company, nor
defendant Cox, has moved for an entry of jud,qment
thereon. The plaintiffs are not precluded thereby and
remain free to issue another garnishment in the same
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matter if they so desire. :Further, Cox could never
secure a judgment-nor would he attempt to do so,
since such attempt would constitute a general appearance on his part. In this respect, it is interesting to note
that no attempt is being made in this appeal to have
the garnishee represented (as can be seen from the
caption of respondent's brief).
POINT III.
THE QUASHING OF SUMMONS SERVED
ON COX IN MARYLAND, BASED UPON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS, WAS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The defendant Cox openly admits in his brief (p.
4) that his motion, which was granted by Judge Anderson, to quash service of summons was based upon the
proposition that he was being deprived of his property
without due process of law, contrary to Section 7,
Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah and
contrary to Amendment XIV to the Constitution of
the United States. That basis for granting the motion
was clearly erroneous, for the United States Supreme
Court has sanctioned the procedure whereby constructive service or personal service in a foreign state can
be used to obtain in rem jurisdiction, allowing the
plaintiff to proceed in the main action against property
of the defendant in the hands of a third party. Chicago
R.R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 19 S. Ct. 797 (1899);
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S. Ct. 625 (1905).

9

The defendant's contention that Penrnoyer v. Neff, 95
U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 ( 1877), prohibits a determination of personal liability when personal service is not
made within the State is not contested; however, under
this theory the plaintiff's are proceeding only against
a policy of liability insurance as a res; there is no personal liabilty involved.
The question involved in this case is the availability
of a res subject to garnishment. The constitutional question would arise only if it were to be determined that
no res existed. However, Judge Jeppson ruled that a
res did exist which could be reached by plaintiffs to
acquire in rem jurisdiction (R. 60-61).
Furthermore, Judge J eppson's ruling that a chose
in action existed which could be the subject of an in rem
proceeding was tied to the ruling as to the nature of
the appearance. Judge Jeppson's ruling that the appearance was special was specifically dependent upon
considering the action to be one in rem. This was made
evident by the Order (R. 61) :
" . . . such appearance did not constitute a
general appearance since the aforesaid ruling of
the court that in rem jurisdiction can be had
therein is considered by the Court to be a special
appearance." (Emphasis added) .
This correlative treatment of the two issues by
Judge Jeppson points out the inconsistency in the
defendant's position. Nevertheless, the defendant sought
to overturn Judge J eppson's ruling on only one of the
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mutually dependent issues. Judge J eppson's thinking
was that since in rem jurisdiction could be had then
the defendant Cox would be considered to have made
a special appearance, but if no chose in action existed,
then the action could not be in rem and Cox would have
made a general appearance inasmuch as he appeared
in resistance to a Motion to Amend the Complaint.
Again we come back to the question of the availability
of a res subject to garnishment.
It appears from the defendant's brief that he did
not consider the action to be in rern, as did Judge
Jeppson, but rather a personal action against a nonresident of the State of Utah. This basic faulty thinking
on the part of the defendant has permeated the entire
record and the Respondent's brief (P. 12) wherein
he contends:
" . . . Cox's attorney appeared to resist the
proposed Amendment ... on the ground (that)
Cox had no property in the State of Utah which
could be made the subject of an in rem proceeding. The substance of the appearance was to resist jurisdiction over the person of Cox."
The two sentences of the fore going argument are
clearly contrary positions. The only possible meaning
which can be derived from the statement is that Cox
was claiming that plaintiffs were seeking " ... a personal judgment . . . under the label of an 'in rem
theory' ... " (Resp. Br. 30). Appellants have consistently pointed out that they are not proceeding in
personam; rather, they are proceeding only against the
res.
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On page 13 of his brief, the defendant gives his
ground for making the motion to quash service of
summons (which was granted by Judge Anderson) as
being that" ... the court did not have jurisdiction over
his person ... " (Emphasis added) . Furthermore, the
defendant repeatedly cites Pennoyer v. Neff, supra,
for the proposition that extra-territorial service of process will not confer jurisdiction which will support a
personal judgment.
That the service of summons upon Cox in Maryland was pursuant to an in rem action is obvious from
the Summons. The Summons informs Cox that a policy
of liability insurance issued by The Travelers Company would be garnished and that" . . . Proceedings thereunder will be had 'in
rem', and your rights under said policy, and the
liabilities of the insurer to you concerning those
rights, will be garnished and attached."
In other words, the Summons made it abundantly
clear that the plaintiffs were proceeding against The
Travelers Insurance Company's obligation to pay under
the liability insurance policy. The plaintiffs are not
proceeding against property held in the possession of
Cox, but rather property in the possession of The
Travelers Insurance Company. This in rem action is
not an attempt to make an attachment of transitory,
intangible property in the possession of Cox, but rather
effectuates a garnishment of the obligation held by The
Travelers Insurance Company.
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The plaintiff's course of action under Count II of
the Amended Complaint is the same as that used by
the plaintiffs in Ackerman v. Tobin, supra; Finch v.
Great American Ins. Co., supra; Brainard v. Rogers,
supra; and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Citizens' Bank,
supra. In those cases the plaintiffs garnished the underwriters' obligations under insurance contracts and constructively served the non-resident defendants, thereby
creating in rem jurisdiction. The constructive service
in those cases did not create in pers<mam jurisdiction,
but rather gave the defendants notice that obligations
due them from the insurance companies had been garnished and were subject to being taken in satisfaction
of the plaintiffs' claims.
In those cases the garnishee-insurance companies
objected to the garnishment on grounds similar to those
used by defendant Cox in the case at bar, i.e., no obligation was due and owing the defendant by the garnishee at the moment of garnishment. The garnishees
in the cited cases attempted to secure judgments in
their favor against the plaintiffs just as Utah Rule
64D (i) provides. Those judgments would not have
settled the conflicts between plaintiffs and defendants,
but merely those between plaintiffs and garnishees as
to the existence of a res sufficient to support a garnishment lien. However, in all of those cases the garnishees
were unsuccessful in their attempts to defeat in rem
jurisdiction. As has been previously mentioned in this
brief, The Travelers Insurance Company took no action
towards the entry of a judgment in its favor in this case.
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As will be carefully noted, the objections in the
cited cases were made by the garnishee-insurance companies, whereas, in the case before this Court, the objection was (as appears from the face of the record) made
by the defendant Cox. In fact the objection made by
defendant Cox went to a matter clearly separate and
distinct from the possession of a res by the garnishee.
As previously mentioned, Cox filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on the ground that the
Court did not have jurisdiction over his person and consequently would be depriving him of his constitutional
rights since The Travelers Insurance Company had
no obligation then due to him. Cox undoubtedly had a
right to attempt to quash the service of summons but
not on the ground he used-namely, that no property
existed which could be the subject of an in rem action.
If Cox had no property as he asserts, then why should
he be concerned about its disposition? Why should he
bother to appear in court to protect his non-existent
property?
The truth of the matter is that The Travelers
Insurance Company is, and has been, the party concerned with the existence of a res subject to garnishment. It is The Travelers Insurance Company that
would normally object to the garnishment on the basis
that it was not obligated to Cox-not Cox who would
object to an obligation owed him by Travelers. Yet,
The Travelers Insurance Company has not sought a
judgment against the plaintiffs, nor has it sought any
order. As a matter of fact, The Travelers Insurance
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Company has made no appearance save to answer the
garnishment interrogatories. The Travelers Insurance
Company has not even appended its name to the Respondent's Brief.
Therefore, the only effective Order that Judge
Anderson could, or in fact did, issue was one quashing
personal service upon Cox. Judge Anderson made it
abundantly clear on May 25, 1964 (R. 62-63), that he
would not reverse the prior order of Judge Jeppson
involving the same matters of law and fact (See App.
Br. 10). Judge Jeppson's prior order (R. 60-61) had
emphatically stated that Cox had a chose in action under
a liability insurance policy which could be reached by
the plaintiffs to acquire in rem jurisdiction.
Thus, the order of Judge Jeppson that a chose
in action existed which was subject to garnishment
still exists as a viable and enforceable order-and Cox
has not appealed from that Order! The case is consequently still at issue since The Travelers Insurance
Company has obtained no judgment relieving it of
liability as garnishee.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that an insurance contract does provide a res which is subject to garnishment
as a chose in action under Rule 64D. The attachment
of such a chose in action in the possession of a garnishee
creates no personal liability, and is therefore constitutionally valid.
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The extensive argument relating to garnishment
of the insurer's obligation under a liability insurance
contract should not be considered to detract from the
viability of the other two points made by these appellants. This emphasis has been necessitated by the respondent's failure to squarely face the real issue involved
and the nationwide importance of that issue being
soundly and realistically decided in this case.
It is also strongly contended by the appellants with
equal sincerity that (I) defendant Cox's appearance
before Judge Jeppson on November 6, 1963, waived his
objection to personal jurisdiction and constitutes a
general appearance, and ( 2) the Order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Anaconda Company on the merits of the controversy is unsupportable
under the facts and the record before this Court.

Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER and
WILFORD A. BEESLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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